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The Study In Brief
The Canadian government made major changes in 2014 to both the Temporary Foreign Worker (TFW) 
Program and the permanent economic immigration system. Under the previous system and its enforcement, 
temporary foreign workers were in competition with some Canadian residents, resulting in a major 
political backlash. In addition, permanent immigrants to Canada were not generally moving to locations 
with the strongest demand for jobs. 
The federal changes to the TFW Program limited the kinds of workers companies could bring in, made 
the applications more rigorous, and set an employer-specific cap on the use of TFWs. These changes will 
lead to a decrease in the number of TFWs working in Canada.
In the permanent immigration system, the government modified the traditional points system and 
created the Express Entry System. International applicants must meet a threshold of points before the 
government will invite them to apply for immigration. The system is skewed toward labour-market 
demand. It rewards workers who have skills that the federal government determines the labour market 
needs. It also rewards permanent immigrants who have a Canadian job offer.
We expect that the changes to the permanent immigration system will have many positive results. 
Immigrants will have better skills and improved job-market outcomes, and they will meet employer needs 
more closely than permanent immigrants did in the past. Likewise, recent changes to the TFW Program 
will improve the labour market for existing residents. 
However, the changes in the immigration system may have some unintended consequences. First, 
they make it difficult for international students at Canadian universities to become permanent residents. 
Further, whereas TFWs were the main source of labour-market competition for Canadian residents 
until 2014, new permanent immigrants will increasingly compete with Canadian residents. This change 
will have profound implications for interprovincial migration. Lastly, the permanent immigration policy 
prioritizes skills currently in demand, and that preference may decrease the immigration of workers whose 
skills may be more important in the longer term. 
Although, on the whole, the recent changes are an improvement to Canadian immigration policy, the 
federal government should consider addressing these potential negative consequences as it moves forward 
with its reforms. Those refinements would entail:
• better incorporating recent international graduates of Canadian universities into the permanent immigration 
system;
• creating more permanent immigration opportunities for immigrants with skills the Canadian economy may 
need in the future, although they are not in demand in today’s labour market; and
• addressing the concern that permanent international immigrants will reduce the incentive for Canadian 
residents to move among the provinces to seek better opportunities. 
All things considered, in terms of substituting for existing Canadian workers, we argue that the new 
immigration system will make TFWs less attractive and permanent immigrants more competitive.
C.D. Howe Institute Commentary© is a periodic analysis of, and commentary on, current public policy issues. Rosemary Shipton 
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2Although the new rules have not yet been tested 
and many details need to be fine-tuned, we argue that 
the changes to both the permanent immigration 
system and TFW policies are substantial. These 
changes will have the effect of matching immigrants 
better to current employer needs and will improve 
the labour market for existing Canadians. However, 
the changes may have the unintended consequence 
of sacrificing the long-term immigration needs of 
the Canadian economy.
Migration – both international and interprovincial 
– is critical to the way the Canadian economy 
responds to economic shocks. Canada is a 
decentralized federation, with sparsely populated 
regional resource economies subject to upswings 
and downswings because of gyrations in the world 
prices of commodities. Migration to and from 
the resource-poor but population-rich parts of 
the country is key to spreading the effects – both 
positive and negative – of resource booms and busts 
across the country.
Before the changes to our immigration policy 
framework in 2014, permanent immigrants in 
Canada did not seem to respond to market signals 
such as booms and busts in regional economies. 
In contrast, TFWs and interprovincial migrants 
responded strongly, especially by locating close to 
employment opportunities. Consequently, TFWs 
became substitutes for interprovincial immigrants, 
whereas permanent immigrants did not. The recent 
changes to immigration policy are likely to alter 
these patterns. 
We are interested in the interaction of temporary 
and permanent migration with internal labour 
markets. To the extent that immigrants are used 
to meet the increased demand for labour when 
provinces are booming, potential migrants from the 
rest of Canada are discouraged from moving to seek 
higher wages and do not benefit from the resource 
boom via the migration mechanism. The additional 
supply of immigrant labour also mitigates wage 
increases that would otherwise occur as a result of 
the boom. Once the boom is over and the labour 
demand subsides, Canada may be left with a surplus 
of immigrant workers in that region.
Immigration Policy Changes
In changing its immigration policy, the federal 
government has modified the traditional points 
system and created the Express Entry System. 
International applicants must meet a threshold of 
points before the federal government will invite 
them to apply for permanent immigration. The 
system is skewed toward labour-market demand. 
It rewards workers who have skills that the federal 
 The authors thank Benjamin Dachis of the C.D. Howe Institute and several anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier 
drafts. They retain responsibility for any remaining errors and the views expressed.
In the past two years, the Canadian federal government has 
implemented changes to policies governing the entry of 
both temporary foreign workers (TFWs) and permanent 
immigrants. 
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1 Labour Market Opinion (LMO) tests were in place until the end of 2014. Following the changes in the TFW program, 
LMO tests were replaced by the Labour Market Impact Assessment (LMIA) tests, which follow the same objective of 
avoiding the displacement of existing Canadian workers by incoming TFWs.
government determines the labour market currently 
needs. It also rewards permanent immigrants who 
have a Canadian job offer.
The federal changes to the TFW Program limit 
the kinds of TFWs companies can bring into the 
country, make the applications more rigorous, and 
set an employer-specific cap on the use of TFWs. 
These changes will lead to a decrease in the number 
of TFWs working in Canada.
Although, on the whole, the recent changes are 
an improvement to Canadian immigration policy, 
the federal government should consider addressing 
the potential negative consequences as it implements 
its reforms. Those refinements would entail:
• better incorporating recent international 
graduates of Canadian universities into the 
permanent immigration system;
• creating more permanent immigration 
opportunities for immigrants with skills the 
Canadian economy may need in the future, 
although they are not in demand in today’s 
labour market; and
• addressing the concern that permanent 
international immigrants will reduce the 
incentive for Canadian residents to move among 
the provinces to seek better opportunities. 
The Previous Immigr ation 
System and Labour M arkets  
in Canada
By their nature, but also because of different 
immigration policies, the three migration flows 
we study in this Commentary – interprovincial 
migrants, TFWs, and permanent immigrants – 
exert different outcomes on the local labour market. 
We argue that, before the recent reforms, most 
permanent immigrants, including those selected 
through the Federal Skilled Worker Program, were 
not market and employer driven, in contrast to most 
of the TFWs. 
The number of permanent international 
immigrants has steadily increased since the mid-
1990s, with slightly more than 250,000 entering the 
country in 2014. The number of TFWs grew rapidly 
during the same period and peaked in 2009 at 
191,000 per year (Figure 1). Since then, the number 
of TFWs has averaged about 175,000 per year. 
Temporary Foreign Workers
TFWs coming into Canada through the various 
TFW programs are meant to be temporary 
additions to the labour force and, therefore, market 
and employer driven. Their recruitment is subject 
to a set of labour-market tests carried out by 
Employment and Social Development Canada 
(ESDC) and by immigration authorities. ESDC 
required these tests for 38 percent of the total 
TFWs admitted to Canada in 2012 (Worswick 
2013). The purpose of the tests is to ensure that 
the vacant job allocated to a specific TFW cannot 
be filled by an existing Canadian worker located in 
the vicinity (see Worswick 2013 and Gross 2014).1 
When their employment is over, as in seasonal 
employment, TFWs must return to their country of 
origin. Unless they are skilled workers, TFWs are 
not allowed to come with dependents. In general, 
the typical duration of a TFW position is for one 
year, and it can be renewed once. 
Certain TFW programs are not necessarily 
demand driven – the International Experience 
Canada Program, for example, and the permits 
issued to spouses of foreign nationals in high-
skilled occupations. Based on a survey of all 
4categories in the TFW programs before the 
recent reform and the application of conservative 
assumptions, we estimate that about 65 percent of 
TFWs are market-driven immigrants.2
Permanent Migrants
Permanent migrants coming into Canada can 
be divided in three classes: economic migrants, 
family reunification migrants, and refugees. Clearly, 
the immigrants coming from the family and 
the refugee classes are immigrant driven in the 
sense that the process is initiated by immigrant 
applications rather than by employers. Before the 
recent changes to immigration policy, most of 
the economic immigrants who came to Canada 
through the Federal Skilled Worker Program 
were immigrant driven. The federal government 
selected these workers under the point system that 
allocated points based on a screening of personal 
characteristics such as age, education, and language 
proficiency. For the other categories of economic 
2 Working from Worswick (2013), Table 2, we evaluate whether each category of the TFWs is demand driven or not. The 
categories subject to LMO evaluations (38%) are obviously demand driven. Among the others, the two types of TFWs that 
are less likely to be demand driven are those coming under the Canadian Experience Program (students from Canadian 
institutions) and spouses of skilled workers.
Figure 1: Migration Flows in Canada
Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), Facts and Figures 2014.
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migrants (Canadian Experience Class, Provincial 
Nominees, Live-in Caregivers, and Skilled Trades), 
the classification between demand-driven and 
immigrant-driven migrants was less clear cut. 
Nevertheless, all those categories also included 
dependents (spouses and children) that were clearly 
not demand driven. All in all, making conservative 
assumptions and using the 2014 breakdown of 
flows of economic migrants (see CIC, Facts and 
Figures 2014), we estimate that only 9.9 percent 
of all permanent immigrants could be identified as 
demand driven. 3
Furthermore, it is important to note that most 
economic immigrants coming from the Provincial 
Nominee Programs (PNP) were demand driven. 
Seidle (2013) shows that most of them were 
initially admitted to Canada as TFWs, even though 
there were differences across the provinces. The 
TFW Program seemed to be the main channel 
of market- and employer-driven immigration in 
Canada before the recent reforms. 
When admitted to Canada before 2014, 
permanent immigrants lived wherever they wanted 
and did not have to go to booming areas where 
labour shortages had been observed. The admitted 
candidates could also bring their relatives under 
the accompanying family scheme. They tended to 
concentrate in big cities such as Toronto, Vancouver, 
and Montreal, where they found a strong diaspora. 
(See Beine, Docquier, and Özden 2011 on the 
network effect.) 
Permanent economic immigrants (including 
Federal Skilled Workers, family reunification 
migrants, and refugees) reported around 61 percent 
participation rate in the job market in December 
2014, compared with around 67 percent for the 
Canadian born.4 This difference can be explained 
by three key factors: the mismatch between the 
skills of the immigrants and vacant jobs; the 
corresponding mismatch for their family members; 
and the fact that they were free to move anywhere, 
including to areas with excessive labour supply.
One of the principal differences between the 
Express Entry System for permanent immigrants 
introduced in January 2015 and the previous system 
is the way the pool is managed. In the former 
point system, applicants who got more than the 
minimum number of points were put in a pool, and 
the government issued invitations to immigrate to 
Canada based on a first-come, first-served basis. 
With the new system, immigration offers will be 
made to the top-ranked candidates in the pool. The 
other main difference affecting the probability of 
being selected is the much greater importance of 
a job offer from a Canadian employer (see below 
for more details on the new system). With these 
changes, the permanent immigrant selection process 
becomes much more demand driven. 
The interprovincial migrant channel is largely 
demand driven: the prospect of finding a better 
job is clearly an important motivation for moving. 
However, Canadians migrate to another province 
3 To estimate this share, we identified how many of the 2014 permanent immigrants (260,000 in total) we could reasonably 
classify as demand driven. We classified family-class immigrants as immigrant driven. Within the economic immigrants, 
we could also considered the dependents as immigrant driven. Among the principal permanent immigrant applicants, 
three classes could be considered as (partly) demand driven: the Canadian Experience Class, the Live-in Caregivers, and 
the Provincial Nominees. Considering that these immigrants were all demand driven (a conservative assumption), at most 
47,000 permanent immigrants could be considered as demand-driven immigrants. 
4 Data on the participation of immigrants in the labour force in this essay are taken from the Labour Force Survey. We report 
the last number before the changes to the permanent immigrant system in early 2015. 
6for other reasons too, such as better geographic 
amenities or to take advantage of improved 
education and health services at a lower tax rate 
(see Boadway and Flatters 1982 for a discussion of 
fiscally induced migration). 
Migr ation Flows and 
the Canadian Industrial 
Structure
The extraction of a natural resource (such as oil 
and gas, minerals and potash) is geographically 
located in the area where the resource is found. 
Frequently, the site is in the hinterland of less-
populated provinces, far from major labour markets. 
As a result, resource booms are characterized by 
temporary labour shortages for a wide variety of 
skills in the extraction area. 
Companies have to find ways to attract workers 
from non-booming areas to migrate to the booming 
area. The resulting competition puts upward 
pressures on wages in both areas. Because of tight 
conditions in the labour market, it would be difficult 
for a regional economy with a booming natural 
resource sector to produce other traded goods to be 
exported to other regions of the country and the 
rest of the world. Consequently, a booming area 
will typically be characterized by a non-diversified 
industrial base (fewer manufacturing goods and 
other traded products) and a large service (or 
non-traded) sector. This phenomenon was termed 
the “Dutch disease” in an influential article in The 
Economist in 1977. 
As long as the natural resource sector is booming, 
the lack of diversification of the booming economy 
is not a problem for overall economic well-being. 
Promoting diversification of the industrial base 
might even decrease economic well-being in the 
short term. Diversification nevertheless provides 
some insurance to the local economy for the period 
when the resource boom is over. 
The first channel of transmission of the Dutch 
disease is related to the scarcity of labour – what 
has been called the “resource movement effect” 
(see Corden and Neary 1982). Labour will move 
from the trade-exposed manufacturing sector to 
the resource and service sectors, thereby pushing 
up wages. The second channel, called the “spending 
effect,” goes through the exchange rate. Natural 
resources are traded in international markets, and 
a resource boom, driven by higher prices for the 
resource and/or the discovery of new reserves, 
generates an increase in domestic demand for 
non-traded goods and services and leads to an 
overall improvement in the terms of trade for 
the economy. In a floating exchange-rate regime, 
the rate will appreciate, resulting in a weakening 
of the competitiveness of the trade-exposed 
manufacturing sector.
With the recent substantial drop in oil prices 
and the depreciation of the Canadian dollar, many 
observers of the Canadian economy expect stronger 
growth in Canadian manufacturing sectors. This 
phenomenon might be viewed as a reverse Dutch 
disease. If some of the loss in manufacturing 
production is irreversible, however, this sudden 
change may not undo all the original effects of the 
Dutch disease. 
Migration and Dutch Disease
In a recent study, Beine, Coulombe, and Vermeulen 
(BCV 2015) analyze how various migration 
channels might mitigate the effect of the Dutch 
disease at the provincial level in Canada. First, 
they demonstrate that the resource windfall tends 
to decrease the relative size of the manufacturing 
sector in the resource-rich provinces. Next, they 
estimate in the empirical analysis to what extent the 
Dutch disease effect is mitigated by the introduction 
of migration flows. They consider three migration 
channels: permanent immigrants selected under the 
point system, TFWs, and interprovincial migrants. 
According to this empirical analysis, each of the 
three migration flows has a different impact on 
the effect that a resource boom has on the relative 
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size of the booming province’s manufacturing 
sector. Consequently, part of the regional Dutch 
disease in Canada is alleviated by the inflow of 
TFWs and interprovincial migrants in booming 
provinces. These migrants relieve pressure on the 
local manufacturing sector by preventing the wage 
rate from rising. From a booming province’s policy 
perspective, both these immigration channels 
are efficient market mechanisms for promoting 
diversification. 
BCV (2015) show that the effect of TFWs and 
interprovincial migrants in lessening the regional 
Dutch disease can be substantial. In Alberta from 
2002 and 2009, for example, 50–60 percent of 
the regional Dutch disease was alleviated by the 
combined TFW and interprovincial migration 
channels.
When the resource boom is over, interprovincial 
migrants may return to their province of origin, 
and the need for TFWs will fade away. BCV 
(2015) show that, due to the entry of TFWs and 
interprovincial migrants during the boom, the 
Alberta economy has been better prepared to 
withstand the sharp decrease in the price of oil 
since the end of 2014. The use of workers from 
other provinces and other countries has contributed 
to diversifying the booming resource economy. 
Without the entry of these workers, the Dutch 
disease might have crippled most other industrial 
activities outside the booming resource sector and 
the associated economic activities. 
Although both TFWs and interprovincial 
migrants appear to react to the same market signals 
in relation to a resource boom, they can also be 
substitutes or complements in labour markets, as we 
see below. 
Tempor ary Foreign Workers, 
Per m anent Migr ants, and 
Competition with Canadians 
Beine and Coulombe (2014) analyze empirically 
the possible competition for jobs between 
Canadian residents and both incoming TFWs 
and permanent international migrants under the 
previous immigrant selection system. By Canadian 
residents, we mean not only the Canadian born but 
also former immigrants who have integrated into 
the Canadian labour force.5 Beine and Coulombe 
(2014) specifically analyze the impact of TFWs and 
permanent immigrants on interprovincial migration 
in Canada. In this section, we highlight their key 
results. ( Details of their estimation techniques are 
presented in online Appendix A.)
Beine and Coulombe (2014) estimate a migration 
model across provinces and over time where 
the interprovincial migration rate (both net and 
gross migration) is potentially determined by the 
permanent international immigrants rates (economic 
class), the TFW rates, and a set of other control 
variables. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the results for 
the effect, respectively, of TFWs and permanent 
immigrants on interprovincial migration.
The key result demonstrated in Table 1 is that 
the impact of TFWs on interprovincial migration 
flows is negative and highly significant. The 
implication, then, is that TFWs are substitutes for 
interprovincial migrants. The inflow of TFWs into 
a province decreases the migration of Canadians 
into (increases it out of ) the province. If the impact 
of TFWs had been positive and significant, TFWs 
would have been a complement to Canadian 
workers. If TFWs are neither substitutes nor 
complements for Canadian workers, the estimated 
impact of TFWs would not have been significant.
5 We define interprovincial migrants to include former permanent immigrants who arrived in one province, filled out at least 
one income tax report in that province, and moved to another province later on. 
8The impact of TFWs on interprovincial 
migration is not only negative and significant 
but substantial, too. Beine and Coulombe (2014) 
estimate that 100 additional TFWs arriving in 
a given province over one year reduces the net 
inflow of about 53 existing Canadian workers to 
this province in that year (Table 1, first column). 
This figure reflects the sum of two effects, one in 
terms of reduced immigration, and the other in 
terms of increased outmigration. Take, for example, 
TFWs landing in Ontario. First, TFWs create more 
competition with existing Canadian workers, who, 
on average, find it more profitable to leave Ontario 
– the traditional displacement effect. Second, 
TFWs landing in Ontario might deter prospective 
internal migrants from other parts of Canada 
coming to settle in Ontario. In this model, the 
direct displacement effect explains 40 percent of the 
net effect, while the reduction in gross provincial 
migration contributes to 60 percent of the net effect. 
The results for the 18–24 year olds show that 
the young are more than twice as responsive to 
the presence of TFWs as the overall population. 
In terms of intergenerational equity, this number 
is important and has significant implications for 
the dynamics of the Canadian labour market. Job 
opportunities in other provinces are particularly 
important for young workers from depressed regions. 
Beine and Coulombe (2014) also provide an 
estimate of the long-run effect of the entry of 
TFWs on interprovincial mobility (for more details, 
see online Appendix A). While the short-run 
effects are interpreted as the impact on flows within 
the year, the long-run effect captures the impact 
on the stock of interprovincial migrants – when 
flows have fully adjusted to the initial increase of 
Short Run Long Run
All migrants -53 -182
18–64 both sexes -59 -200
18–24 both sexes -113 -349
25–44 both sexes -70 -233
45–64 both sexes -35 -125
18–24 males -133 -344
18–24 females -94 -257
Table 1: Quantitative Effects of 100 TFWs on 
Interprovincial Migration Flows 
Note: All results are significant at the 1 percent level.
Source: Beine and Coulombe (2014), Table 5. The figures 
can be interpreted as the impact of 100 additional incoming 
TFW in one given province on the number of net 
interprovincial immigrants of each type in that particular 
province.
Short Run Long Run
All migrants -16* -55*
18–64 both sexes -19* -66*
18–24 both sexes -33 -103
25–44 both sexes -23* -79*
45–64 both sexes -10** -35**
18–24 males -34 -103
18–24 females -34 -94
Table 2: Quantitative Effects of 100 Permanent 
Migrants on Interprovincial Migration Flows 
Note: ** indicates that the effect is significant at the  
5 percent level, * at the 10 percent level; no asterisk indicates 
that the effect is not statistically significant at even the  
10 percent level.
9 Commentary 446
incoming TFWs. They estimate that for 100 TFWs 
arriving in a given province every year indefinitely 
(and leaving after the year), the effect translates 
into a decrease in the stock of net migrants in the 
receiving province by 182 people. The long-run 
effect is larger than one for one (182/100) because 
the arrival of TFWs might prevent potential 
interprovincial migrants from moving with their 
spouses and dependents.
The long-run effect of TFWs refers to a situation 
in which an economy uses TFWs in response to a 
permanent shock. In that case, the sustained use 
of 100 TFWs every year prevents the (net) arrival 
of a stock of 182 internal migrants. The long-run 
effect does not strictly apply to a resource economy 
where TFWs are used as a buffer to alleviate the 
temporary impact of booms and busts on the labour 
market. Obviously, resource windfalls are subject 
to shocks that are temporary but that display some 
effects over time. The long-run effect provides a 
benchmark beyond the pure short-run effect.
Beine and Coulombe (2014) also find that 
permanent immigrants do not have a robust and 
significant effect on the displacement of Canadian 
residents. In Table 2, the impact of permanent 
migrants on interprovincial migration flows is 
negative but not very significant. The potential 
impact of permanent migrants is also not very 
substantial. They estimate that 100 additional 
permanent migrants arriving in a given province 
over one year prevents the net inflow of about 
16 existing Canadian workers (Table 2). For 100 
permanent migrants arriving in a given province, 
that translates into a decrease in the stock of net 
migrants in the receiving province by 55 people.
Permanent immigrants, in contrast to TFWs, 
respond less to market signals. The TFW Program 
is mainly an employer-driven migration system, 
whereas the permanent immigrant channel is 
mainly an immigrant-driven system. These findings 
suggest that the profile of the immigrants, the 
way they are selected, and their capacity to fill 
vacant jobs in the Canadian labour market are key 
determinants of the degree of substitution with 
existing Canadian workers. 
Efficiency and Equity 
Implications of TFWs in a 
Feder al Context
Some mechanisms – including federal-provincial 
fiscal transfers, individual tax transfer and social 
insurance systems, and interprovincial migration to 
booming regions – allow non-resource provinces 
to benefit from resource booms. Interprovincial 
migration transmits some of the benefits of the 
boom both to migrating workers and, because of 
the resulting increase in wage rates, to those who 
stay at home. 
Before the immigration reforms that began 
to be implemented in 2015, the TFW Program 
was the main immigration tool used to alleviate 
labour shortages in booming regions. In effect, 
TFWs partly shut down one channel by which 
the internal labour market responds to a resource 
boom and spreads the benefits to other provinces. 
From an efficiency point of view, the TFW 
Program facilitates the expansion of resource and 
non-resource production in booming provinces 
by relieving excess demand for labour. Wage rates 
in the resource-rich provinces and also in other 
provinces will not rise as much as they otherwise 
would. TFWs might therefore mitigate the 
resource movement effect mentioned above. From 
that perspective, the TFW Program represents an 
advantage to resource-rich provinces in search of 
labour to fill a rapidly expanding economy. 
At the same time, by offering an alternative 
to internal migration, TFWs reduce the market 
response of increased wages and employment 
to the excess demand for labour. The TFW 
Program therefore discourages the movement 
of interprovincial migrants in search of better 
incomes – something that is beneficial for migrants. 
Domestic migrants would gain not only higher 
salaries but also opportunities for training and 
1 0
6 Green and Green (2004) provide a historical analysis of the Canadian immigration system. 
7 Again we are using Labour Force survey data for 2014, the last year before the reform of the immigrant system.
experience that enhance their human capital. 
Although the TFW Program is helpful for the 
resource-rich provinces, it precludes some of the 
benefits of the resource boom from being spread to 
workers in the rest of Canada. 
The adverse consequences of TFWs for internal 
migrants are mitigated by two considerations. First, 
if the resource boom is expected to be temporary, 
TFWs will prevent the possibly costly short-term 
internal migration of workers, many of whom 
return to their home province after the boom 
subsides. TFWs automatically return home after 
their work permits are finished. Second, resource 
booms can attract excessive internal migrants to the 
extent that provincial resource revenues are used to 
create preferential fiscal benefits both for migrants 
and through favourable business taxes for firms 
that create jobs for migrants (Boadway and Flatters 
1982). TFWs can reduce excess fiscally induced 
migration from these two sources.
More generally, the benefits of TFWs can be 
judged in the context of the gainers and the losers 
among all stakeholders from the resource boom. If 
market adjustments are efficient, labour as a whole 
will stand to gain from the boom. The advantage 
is compromised, however, by labour-market and 
migration rigidities, especially those that result in 
involuntary unemployment in the non-resource 
provinces. But to the extent that the TFW Program 
suppresses wage increases in the booming region, a 
lower share of the benefits of the resource boom will 
accrue to Canadian workers, with a greater share 
going to capital owners, including the domestic and 
foreign owners of resource firms. Future generations 
are largely excluded, in particular because they will 
both forgo a share of resource rents and bear the 
costs of any environmental degradation that  
may occur.
Refor ms of the Immigr ation 
System
The Previous Permanent Immigration System
The point system was introduced in 1967 in Canada 
to avoid potential discrimination in the immigrant 
selection process.6 The point system ignored, for 
example, the immigrant’s country of origin. 
Many empirical analyses in Canada have 
underlined the difficulty that permanent immigrants 
selected by the point system face in integrating into 
the Canadian labour market (see Bloom, Grenier, 
and Gunderson 1994). Some simple statistics reflect 
the relatively poor performance of permanent 
immigrants in the Canadian labour market. On 
average for 2014, the overall national participation 
rate for permanent immigrants was 61.6 percent, 
compared with 67.5 percent for the Canadian born. 
The percentage varies across provinces, but  
in some eastern provinces the employment rate  
fell below 60 percent. Again for 2014, the  
aggregate unemployment rate of permanent 
immigrants was 7.9 percent, compared with 
6.6 percent for the Canadian born.7 These poor 
performances can be explained by several features 
related to the point system.
First, under the old point system, the valuation 
of points did not take into account the place where 
education was acquired. In general, this factor led 
to a discrepancy in the effective human capital level 
for the same nominal level of education between 
Canadian residents, on the one hand, and, on the 
other, the immigrants selected under the point 
system and their families. Coulombe and Tremblay 
(2009) used the results of standard literacy tests 
to compare the cognitive skills of Canadian 
residents with the cognitive skills of immigrants. 
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They found that, for a given level of schooling, 
immigrants selected from countries with a lower 
level of economic development had a lower level of 
cognitive skills than the Canadian born.
On average, the skill-schooling gap of 
immigrants corresponds to three years of schooling 
in Canada. Coulombe and Tremblay (2009) 
estimate that one-third of the gap was caused by 
language difficulties in English or French, and 
two-thirds could be imputed to a lower quality of 
schooling in countries with a lower development 
level. In their survey, Hanushek and Woessmann 
(2008) identify low quality of schooling as being as 
important a factor as the quantity (number of years 
of study) for explaining the low level of human 
capital in less-developed countries. In the new 
Express Entry System, candidates will be required 
to show an educational credential assessment by a 
designated party to make sure their credentials are 
in line with Canadian standards. 
A second feature is that the old point system 
was close to a pure immigrant-driven system of 
immigration policy (Bertoli et al. 2012). The process 
is initiated by the immigrant, and the government 
assesses each candidate on the basis of his or her 
personal characteristics, such as education, age, and 
language proficiency. In contrast, the accumulation 
of points gives little importance to the propensity 
to match labour-market requirements as does a 
demand-driven immigration policy. The example 
of a pure demand-driven system is the H1B 
visa procedure prevailing in the United States. 
Under this system, the visa is granted only to the 
applicants who have been sponsored – who have 
received job offers from US employers. In the old 
Federal Skilled Worker System, candidates received 
15 points out of 100 for a job offer. Nevertheless, 
given the way the pool was managed (first-come, 
first-served basis), this dimension played a minor 
role in the probability of being selected. As a result 
of the old point system in Canada, a large subset of 
permanent immigrants displays a significant skill 
mismatch with respect to labour-market needs.
A final reason for low participation rates and 
high unemployment rates is that the rates are 
computed for the whole category of permanent 
immigrants, not just the economic immigrants. 
This category includes refugees and the family 
class. These classes are clearly not market-driven 
immigrants, and they are less likely to work in 
Canadian labour markets.
Major Changes to the Permanent  
Immigration System
The new policy for permanent immigration 
introduces two important features that should 
correct, at least partially, some of the flaws of the 
old one. We do not provide here a full list of the 
new changes but discuss the most prominent 
features relevant for our analysis.
The first is the way the new Express Entry 
System works. Prospective candidates for 
permanent immigration need first to send the 
immigration authorities a self-declared statement 
of their characteristics. Using the Federal Skilled 
Worker ranking system, they are ranked in a pool, 
and the highest-ranked individuals receive an 
invitation to apply. The candidates who send in an 
application are then evaluated and ranked, using 
the new Comprehensive Ranking System (Table 3). 
This system takes into consideration factors such 
as age and education but also skill transferability 
factors such as language and work experience. 
Unless candidates receive a Provincial Nomination 
(which means in practice that they should already 
be in Canada), they need to get a job offer, validated 
by a positive Labour Market Impact Assessment, 
from a Canadian employer. The valid job offer gives 
50 percent of the total points in the Comprehensive 
Ranking System (600 out of 1,200).We believe that 
it will be almost impossible for a foreign worker 
located outside Canada to enter through the new 
Express Entry System without a Canadian job offer. 
This restriction implies that the pool of successful 
candidates will have skills and work experience 
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in occupations that are more in demand in the 
Canadian labour market.
The second important change concerns the way 
the pool of applicants is going to be managed. 
In the former point system, applicants who got 
more than the minimum number of points were 
put in an inventory: those who were invited to 
immigrate to Canada were determined on a first-
come, first-served basis. This system, combined 
with the existence of backlogs in the processing 
of applications, tended to result in a loss of good 
candidates, who migrated to other countries 
with a faster immigration process. Sometimes a 
prospective migrant stayed in the pool for a period 
of eight years. In contrast, under the new system, 
immigration offers will be made to the top-
ranked candidates in the pool. Early results from 
the beginning of 2015 indicate that the Express 
Entry immigration process could operate within a 
minimum of two months.
These important changes suggest that the new 
point system will move from a mainly immigrant-
driven immigration system to one that is equally 
employer-demand driven. The new system should 
also result in an overall increase in the level of 
human capital of immigrant workers, when human 
Old System New Comprehensive Ranking System
Independent 
Applicant 
With  
Partner
Without  
Partner
With Provincial 
Nomination
(Percent)
Skill transferability - 8.33 8.33 8.33
Education (combined with work experience) - 4.17 4.17 4.17
Foreign work experience - 4.17 4.17 4.17
Adaptability (relatives) 10.00 3.33 0.00 0.00
Human capital factors
80.00 38.33 41.67 41.67
10.00 8.33 9.17 9.17
Education* 25.00 11.67 12.50 12.50
Language 24.00 12.50 13.33 13.33
Canadian work experience 21.00 5.83 6.67 6.67
Job offer (arranged employment) 10.00 50.00 50.00 -
Nomination - - - 50.00
Table 3: Ranking System for Permanent Immigrants – Proportion of Maximum Points per Category 
over Total Points
Notes:  
Only for candidates without a provincial nomination, except for bottom row. 
* or people with certificate of qualification.
Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) website.
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capital is measured, as in Coulombe and Tremblay 
(2009), by a direct measure of skills (test scores or 
wages) instead of years of schooling.
Changes to the Temporary Foreign Worker 
Program
The federal government made major changes to the 
TFW Program in 2014. These changes will alter the 
way TFWs interact with other categories of workers 
in the labour market and lead to a decrease in the 
number of TFWs working in Canada.
The first important change is the way the TFWs 
are split into different categories. In the old system, 
the different categories were distinguished on the 
basis of professional occupations. The new system 
will make a distinction based mostly on wage levels, 
with the exception of some particular occupations 
such as agriculture or live-in caregiving. In turn, 
some changes will introduce more stringent 
regulations, especially for low-wage TFWs.
Second, the reform will strengthen the procedure 
of the labour-market tests to make sure TFWs 
do not crowd out existing Canadian workers. This 
change will target low-wage TFWs in particular. 
Employers must follow a more rigorous procedure 
called the Labour Market Impact Assessment 
(LMIA): they will have to provide additional 
information, such as the number of people born 
in Canada that applied for the available job, 
the number of existing Canadians who were 
interviewed, and the reasons they were not hired. 
These measures aim at decreasing the crowding-out 
effects of TFWs on existing Canadian workers and 
making sure that existing Canadian workers come 
first in line. 
The new LMIA will also make use of some 
improved labour-market information sent to 
existing Canadian workers, including new databases 
of job vacancies. For some categories such as high-
wage positions, Canadian employers must submit 
transition plans along with their LMIA application. 
These plans will include proposed investments 
to help existing Canadian workers to acquire the 
required skills in the vacant jobs through skills 
training or an apprenticeship program. Finally,  
the fee paid by employers for an LMIA will be 
raised from $275 to $1,000, meaning that the costs 
of the LMIA system will be borne almost entirely  
by employers.
Third, there will be a cap on the number of 
TFWs, especially in the low-wage category. 
After 2016, each employer will have to limit the 
proportion of TFWs to 10 percent of the workforce 
in each location of the firm. Furthermore, the 
duration of the work permit will be limited to 
one year instead of two years as before. Employers 
willing to hire low-wage TFWs will have to 
reapply every year for an LMIA. Finally, in order to 
decrease the dependency on TFWs in some sectors, 
the federal government will reduce the length of 
time a TFW in a low-wage occupation can work 
in Canada. All in all, these measures will lead to a 
significant decrease in the number of TFWs in the 
Canadian economy.
TFWs are also prohibited from working in 
some sectors located in high-unemployment areas. 
Immigration authorities will refuse to conduct 
LMIA tests in sectors such as the accommodation, 
food services, or retail trade sectors if the prevailing 
unemployment rate in the specific area exceeds 
6 percent.
These measures will reduce the degree of 
competition and substitutability between TFWs 
and existing Canadian workers. They will also 
reduce the dependency of some sectors on TFWs 
and lead to a decrease of the overall number of 
TFWs working each year in Canada. As such, the 
overall crowding-out effects of TFWs on existing 
Canadian workers will tend to decrease. 
Intended and Unintended 
Effects of the New Refor ms
We expect that the new Express Entry System 
will have obvious economic advantages. The new 
immigrants will have generally higher skills than 
previous immigrants. Also, the degree of mismatch 
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between their skills and labour-market needs 
should decrease. The responsiveness of permanent 
migrants to job opportunities such as those created 
by resource booms will also increase. Overall, this 
reform should lead to a better performance by 
permanent immigrants in labour markets.
Despite these positive developments, the  
Express Entry System will also have unintended 
negative effects. 
First, the reforms may be detrimental to the 
immigration of some categories of prospective 
immigrants. One important category concerns 
international students who have studied in 
Canada. Inflows of foreign students have become 
increasingly important in many developed countries 
such as Canada. International students in Canada 
amount to around 200,000 and represent about 
10 percent of total students in tertiary education 
institutions. They represent a valuable source of 
funding for universities since institutions tend to 
charge higher fees than the ones applied to  
resident students.
They also represent a kind of “disguised brain 
drain” since almost half of foreign students intend to 
stay and work in Canada after completion of their 
academic courses. They are furthermore endowed 
with skills that are more consistent with the needs 
of the domestic labour market. Unsurprisingly, 
given the increasing importance of that category of 
new immigrants in most developed countries, there 
is a growing academic literature devoted to the 
analysis of this important phenomenon.8
International students in Canada have the 
option of applying through the Provincial Nominee 
Program (PNP) or prospecting during their studies 
for valid job offers. It may be easier for potential 
immigrants who have studied in Canada to obtain 
job offers from Canadian employers for two 
reasons: it is an advantage during a job search to 
be located in the country, and potential employers 
may have greater confidence in the quality of a 
Canadian education. These potential migrants, no 
longer eligible for the TFW Program, will have to 
qualify for the Express Entry System, but a large 
subset of them will lack valid job offers that match 
the immigration system guidelines. Job offers are 
important during the two steps of application of the 
new Express Entry System. The uncertainty created 
by the new system might lower the probability to 
receive a valid job offer. In turn, this might lower 
the probability to either receive an invitation to 
apply or to be selected within the Comprehensive 
Ranking System.
In effect, then, the new system, while raising the 
economic adaptability of new economic immigrants, 
will hurt a valuable channel of immigration 
for Canada. International students educated in 
Canadian universities should, if they are accepted 
as immigrants, display a very good match between 
their skills and the needs of the Canadian labour 
market, with the added advantage that they should 
not face any real issues in integrating into the 
Canadian society.
Second, the new reform will increase the degree 
of substitution between new permanent immigrants 
and interprovincial immigrants. In other words, 
we should expect to have more negative and more 
significant numbers under the new regime. This 
result may be seen as negative because it will lead 
to a decrease in the internal mobility of existing 
Canadian workers – something that has always 
been considered a natural adjustment mechanism 
in a decentralized economy subject to significant 
asymmetric shocks. Given that new permanent 
immigrants can become Canadian citizens, however, 
it would not be reasonable to put less weight 
8 See Beine, Noel, and Ragot (2015) for a cross-country analysis of the determinants of inflows of foreign students such as 
tuition fees, universities’ academic quality or job prospects.
1 5 Commentary 446
on them than on internal migrants. Thus, the 
displacement of internal migrants by permanent 
immigrants may not be viewed in the same negative 
light as the displacement by TFWs.
Finally, by putting more emphasis on adaptability 
to current market conditions, the new system 
will decrease the capacity to attract people with 
skills that are currently disregarded but might 
be important in the long term. Current market 
imbalances are imperfect predictors of future 
booming sectors of the economy. Moreover, 
attracting skilled immigrants, irrespective of their 
degree of matching with current jobs, is a gamble 
that, in the future, they will create new economic 
opportunities in sectors that are currently difficult 
to predict. The point system has always been the 
tool for attracting talented people to Canada 
without too much consideration for current 
economic conditions and the capacity of the 
economy to absorb new immigrants (Green and 
Green 2004). Permanent immigrants also include 
entrepreneurs who can create further opportunities 
for Canadian workers beyond the skills they bring 
with them. Still, lowering the immigration flows of 
permanent immigrants during economic downturns 
may favour the convergence of earnings between 
immigrants and the Canadian born.
A related consideration is that current labour 
market conditions can be reversed in the future. 
For instance, resource booms are well known to be 
temporary in nature and to follow cycles – as in the 
recent sharp drop in oil prices. The issue, however, 
is that attracting immigrants on a permanent basis 
to fill up jobs that may well be temporary will 
have long-term problems when resource booms 
turn to busts. The advantage of hiring TFWs to 
fill these jobs is that, when the boom is over, these 
immigrants return to their country of origin. In 
contrast, permanent immigrants who lose their  
jobs after the boom will have to display a high 
degree of adaptability to move to alternative sectors 
of the economy. 
With regard to the new changes in the TFW 
Program, we can consider them as positive 
developments, given the previous evidence of 
these immigrants crowding out existing Canadian 
workers. We should expect that, under the new 
regime, the impact of these TFWs on existing 
Canadian worker mobility will become less 
negative (see Table 1). In other words, the degree  
of substitution between TFWs and existing 
Canadian workers should decrease. 
Recommendations for Refining the New Reforms
To sum up, the new immigration reforms should 
lead to a situation in which resident Canadian 
workers will be less in competition with TFWs 
but more competitive with permanent immigrants. 
Although, on the whole, the recent changes are an 
improvement in Canadian immigration policy, the 
federal government should consider addressing all 
the potential consequences as it moves forward with 
reforms in this area. These refinements will entail:
• finding ways to incorporate recent international 
graduates of Canadian universities into the 
permanent immigration system;
• creating more permanent immigration 
opportunities for immigrants with skills the 
Canadian economy may need in the future, 
although they are not rewarded in today’s labour 
market; and
• addressing the potential impact that permanent 
international immigrants will have on the 
incentive for Canadian residents to move among 
the provinces. 
Conclusions
This essay discusses the impact of some aspects of 
Canadian immigration policy under the previous 
regime. It also tries to forecast some of the 
consequences for Canadian regional economies of 
the changes introduced in 2015 regarding the TFW 
program and the immigration of new permanent 
immigrants. Permanent migrants have various 
advantages and disadvantages over temporary 
workers, and vice versa (Table 4). Governments 
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should consider these factors before making any 
further changes to current policy. 
The previous immigration policy regime included 
distinctive features about the admission to Canada 
of TFWs as well as permanent immigrants through 
the point system. In short, the TFW Program 
was close to a pure demand-driven system, in 
which employers could easily fill up vacant jobs by 
bringing workers from abroad on a temporary basis. 
The point system, in contrast, was close to a typical 
immigrant-driven system, in which candidates 
for permanent immigration were screened and 
admitted on the basis of their personal skills and 
characteristics, with little attention to their capacity 
to match current labour requirements.
The previous system governing TFWs and 
permanent immigrants had both positive and 
negative consequences for Canadian regions. On 
the positive side, the admission of TFWs diversifies 
provinces, especially in resource-rich, boom regions. 
This outcome is important because booms are 
temporary in nature, as the current drop in oil prices 
exemplifies. The TFW Program was popular with 
provincial governments. 
The previous permanent immigrant system gave 
considerable weight to a candidate’s educational 
attainment, as opposed to having a current job 
offer. As a result, Canada admitted candidates with 
general skills. The thinking behind this policy was 
that workers with general skills would adapt to 
future changing needs in the labour market.
The old immigration regime nevertheless had 
flaws. The inflows of TFWs tended to reduce the 
mobility of Canadian workers across provinces. 
That in turn weakened a natural and historical 
channel of regional adjustments to asymmetric 
shocks occurring in Canada. By paying little 
attention to the mismatch between the skills of the 
admitted permanent immigrants and labour market 
needs, the old point system resulted in permanent 
immigrants’ relatively high unemployment rates and 
low participation and employment rates.
Canada’s New Immigration System
The combination of reforms in the admission of 
TFWs and permanent immigrants to Canada  
will have important economic consequences for  
Table 4: Economic Advantages and Disadvantages of Migrant Types
Advantages Disadvantages
TFWs
• Reduce labour shortages in boom periods
• Allow diversification of regional economies
• Prevent inefficient internal migration
• 100% employment rate
• Substitute for existing Canadian workers
• Reduce internal mobility of existing workers
• Decrease incentives for existing Canadians to  
invest in some specific skills
Permanent Migrants
• Little displacement of existing Canadian workers
• In general, skilled immigrants bring overall 
economic benefits (e.g., positive fiscal contribution)
• Contribute to the development of new sectors
• May not reflect short-term and potentially  
long-term needs of economy
• Create pool of unemployed during resource  
bust periods
• Low employment and participation rates
Source: Synthesis from authors’ analysis.
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the economy. First, the changes will reduce the 
inflow of TFWs and decrease the substitutability 
between foreign workers and Canadian workers. 
As a result, there may be an increase in the net 
mobility of Canadian workers from non-booming 
to booming regions. 
This possible outcome has both positive and 
negative consequences. First, by raising the 
economic opportunities for Canadian workers, the 
unemployment rates in non-booming regions may 
be lowered. Young workers may have a chance to 
enter the labour market and acquire the professional 
experience they need for a successful career. 
Second, the reforms in the point system will 
increase the human capital of new permanent 
immigrants and, possibly, their labour market 
performances. The new immigrants will be more 
able to fill vacant jobs – and more substitutable for 
existing Canadian workers. 
Canadian workers will be more in competition 
with permanent immigrants than before, and less 
competitive with TFWs. The fact that permanent 
immigrants will be more inclined to take vacant 
jobs is a positive development. 
Nevertheless, there will be downsides. First, in 
the case of temporary booms, filling vacant jobs 
with permanent workers instead of TFWs creates 
an intertemporal labour mismatch. Second, the new 
system, by putting too much emphasis on the match 
with current needs in the labour market, may reject 
candidates with skills that could turn out to be very 
useful in the future. Current market imbalances are 
imperfect predictors of the skills that will be needed 
in the long term. 
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